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within the EU based on the euro and Schengen areas, and several rings of neighbours 
outside, including the European Economic Area, the regions of the EU’s neighbourhood 
policy and finally some pan-European organisations. While all world regions have their own 
unique features, the European case offers some important lessons that should be of interest 
to other world regions. The first is what appears to be a relatively robust model for single 
market integration. The second consists of the lessons currently being learned on the hazards 
on monetary integration without adequate fiscal and political integration. The third lesson is 
another warning, over the difficulties of anticipating the political dynamics of integration 
processes once set into motion, often described in Europe as a ‘journey to an unknown 
destination’. The fourth consists of the EU’s current efforts to develop a comprehensive 
neighbourhood policy, which is encountering difficult issues of matching ambitious 
objectives with incentives of adequate weight. Nevertheless, the policy sees a landscape of 
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some ugly conflictual or coercive features seen in the cases of other continental hegemons – 
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ontinental regionalism remains an inescapable feature of contemporary international 
relations. Factors of geography combined with elements of common history and 
culture make it so. It may be questioned whether the topic now slips into the 
background given the advance of globalisation, with new communication technologies 
favouring inter-continental economic integration by cutting the costs of distance 
dramatically. However the performance of global governance remains unimpressive, and to 
take just one crucial example, that of trade, regional initiatives are clearly advancing more 
than global ones. In addition, the rise of multipolarity puts the spotlight on how the leading 
poles will behave in their regional neighbourhoods. The champions of multipolarity may 
have the capacity to act as regional hegemons, but this does not yet inform us how these 
actual or potential hegemons will deploy their power; soft, hard, medium or possibly not at 
all. 
This paper reviews Europe’s ongoing experience with its continental regionalism, with a 
view to unveiling points of comparison with the Americas, and the role of Brazil as the 
leading regional power in South America, and one of the leaders in Latin America and the 
Americas as a whole. Brazilians and Europeans may reflect together on how to join in a 
global conversation on this topic with the world’s other continental regions, notably Africa 
and the several Asias, South, South-East and East, each of which have populations 
comparable to or greater than Europe or the Americas. 
Once upon a time, several decades ago, the European-Latin American version of this topic 
had a rather simple format. The then European Community (EC) had launched a clear and 
comprehensive institutional structure for its own integration. This EC was developing its 
relations with Latin America, and in particular was keen to encourage Mercosur to develop 
as a regional integration organisation. Experts in European affairs frequented the capitals of 
Mercosur to explain how the EC worked.  
The story at the European end, however, has now also become a good deal more complicated 
and uncertain as regards its future. 
1. The paradigm of concentric circles – Part I (internal) 
The term concentric circles is currently being used in both Europe and Latin America. 
Europe’s concentric circles are numerous. 
While it is conventional to regard the EU as the centre that has arranged its neighbours in a 
set of concentric circles, the story has become more complicated within the EU itself. At the 
level of informal political discourse, there is talk of hard core and two-tier Europes, while at 
the formal level, the Schengen area and eurozone have permitted opt-outs for some old 
eurosceptic member states (UK), or made inclusion for new member states dependent on 
conditions to be met after accession. The method of ‘enhanced cooperation’ has been written 
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into the treaties, allowing for new initiatives to be taken by a substantial number of states, 
although this has been little used.  
The hard core proposition has been aired for many years as a vague idea by those wishing 
the EU to advance to a fuller federal structure, with the presumption that the core group 
would be based on the original six member states, to be later joined by other member states 
to re-establish the unity of the EU in due course. However this idea has stumbled with the 
division of inclinations between the open federalists (Germany, Belgium and Italy), versus 
France which keeps a distance from the federal idea, while the Netherlands has been turning 
increasingly eurosceptic. France and the Netherlands notably tarnished their hard core 
reputations with negative referendum results over the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, but 
later acquiesced in the repackaging of most of its content in the Treaty of Lisbon, which was 
then again put into doubt by Ireland which had to vote three times before ratifying 
successfully. 
All of the foregoing was part of the political landscape before the current eurozone crisis, but 
now these issues of who should be the centre or hard core, and with what political and 
institutional content, have been dramatically intensified. The brutal logic of financial markets 
has made Germany the undisputed hard core of the eurozone, and exposed further fault 
lines between eurozone states. The role of the Franco-German pair as joint hard core, as in 
the days when their leaders acted as if twins on the European stage has faded: Adenauer-De 
Gaulle, Schmidt-Giscard d’Estaing and Kohl-Mitterrand, followed less convincingly of late 
by Schroeder-Chirac and Merkel-Sarkozy, and now with more explicit differences between 
Merkel and Hollande. But the new divisions have two cross-cutting aspects, financial and 
political. Financially Germany is joined by the Netherlands, Finland and Austria as hard-line 
paymasters of the eurozone, whereas almost all of the ‘Club Med’ have become bail-out 
recipients (Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, together with Ireland) or likely recipients (Spain and 
Italy). This has led to an ominous rift in the psychological-sociological stereotypes depicted 
in the popular media between that of the north characterised as morally superior, thrifty and 
hard-working versus the lazy, corrupt, siesta-loving, early retirement-loving and deficit-
loving south. These stereotypes are further mirrored in the media of the south by images of 
diktat from Berlin, with the burning of German flags in the streets of Athens. These populist 
images are only half-truths if not outright lies, with the Irish and Spanish financial crises 
having been caused by mismanagement by the banks, including those of the north and their 
supervisors of the finances of the real estate sector. But they still have become important 
psycho-political realities, as warned by Mario Monti, the Italian prime minister who defines 
himself as a ‘very German’ economist. These popular stereotypes are reinforced by the long-
standing fault lines in economic policy thinking between ‘monetarists’ and ‘economists’, or 
currently between ‘austerity’ versus ‘growth’, or since everyone favours growth and stability 
together, on how growth is to be boosted.  
At the political level, the debate rages on how the manifest systemic defects of the eurozone 
are to be mended. At the level of short hand, the argument now is that a sustainable 
economic and monetary union needs not only what the EU already has, namely a single 
market and common currency with a central bank, but also a banking union, a fiscal union 
and a political union. In essence the banking union would see a centralised bank regulatory 
and deposit insurance system, the fiscal union would involve some combination of central 
powers over budgets, mutualisation of public debts and a larger common budget, while 
political union would see some further steps towards federalisation. If these steps are taken, 
the fundamental structure of the EU will be reshaped, not excluding the possibility of 
secession by the UK, which might then join one of the external circles, although the present 
government’s preference is to negotiate the repatriation of various EU competences (i.e. 
more opt-outs) while remaining ‘in’ rather than ‘out’. 
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2. The paradigm of concentric circles – Part II (external) 
Given the huge amount of political energies currently being consumed by these internal 
dramas, it might be supposed that little is left over for the complex set of external concentric 
circles seen in the EU’s external and neighbourhood policies. While the internal will surely 
affect the external in due course, for the time being foreign ministers continue to go about 
their business with their concentric circles as if as usual. 
First come the almost-member states, namely the three external members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) – Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein – and as a special case 
Switzerland, which is almost an EEA member. These are states that have accepted the 
application of huge amounts of EU market law in exchange for their businesses and peoples 
being treated as if full members for the four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, 
people). These are states that wanted complete economic integration but could not accept the 
apparent loss of political sovereignty by acceding to the EU (although Iceland has now 
changed its mind, seeking full accession). So elaborate parallel structures have been created 
to manage the EEA, including a special court of justice to rule on disputes. All these states 
have now also joined the Schengen area, which makes them in this respect more integrated 
than some EU member states. 
Second come the micro-states of the neighbourhood (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, the 
Vatican), which are not big enough to warrant either EU or EEA membership, but are even 
more dependent on the EU economically, and are all part of the eurozone and Schengen 
areas as well as largely part of the single market. Most of these micro-states, together with 
the Channel Islands and Isle of Man, have developed important offshore financial markets, 
traditionally as tax havens, but are now increasingly constrained to accept the reach of EU 
financial and fiscal rules. There are points of comparison with the micro-states of the 
Caribbean here. 
Third come the accession candidates. This is where the EU’s regionalism is unique by 
comparison with the other continental regions, in having an explicit integration process for 
the accession of some of its neighbours, in principle any that are democratic, but realities are 
more discriminating (a point to which we return). The accession process amounts to the most 
extensive and intrusive exercise in political conditionality anywhere in the world. The 
candidate state has to submit to negotiations over 35 so-called ‘chapters’ that cover every 
sector of EU law, policies, and political norms, with the need not only to legislate conformity 
with the legendary 30,000 pages of EU law, but also to demonstrate their capacity to 
implement it.1 This method was worked out to manage the accession of the Central and East 
European states, with conditionality designed to ensure that the post-communist regimes 
were truly transformed in line with Western democratic standards. Some recently acceding 
member states, namely Bulgaria and Romania, were considered borderline cases, and so 
remained subject to special monitoring arrangements after accession.  
The ongoing accession process seems not (yet?) to be affected by the eurozone crisis. In the 
major case of Turkey, the accession negotiations were already at an impasse, while Iceland 
has recently and rapidly advanced as accession candidate.  
The full inclusion of the whole of the Balkans remains the political dogma. Croatia is now 
scheduled to accede in July 2013. The other Balkan states are at various stages of the pre-
accession process, and may be viewed as the fourth circle - Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, 
Serbia, Bosnia, and with Kosovo bringing up the tail given its still unresolved status. 
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However in all these cases, the same 35-chapter structure of the accession negotiation process 
is followed in drawing up Stabilisation and Association Agreements. These are accompanied 
by the same regular reports by the Commission grading degrees of progress in accordance 
with EU law and standards, but with longer time horizons anticipated for full compliance. 
Financial assistance to the pre-accession Balkan states is substantial, somewhere between the 
member states and the official ‘neighbourhood’ states, to which we now turn. 
The fifth circle is that of the officially named European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The 
ENP is divided between east and south. To the east, six European former Soviet states, 
excluding Russia, are grouped also under the Eastern Partnership regional programme (from 
west to east: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan). To the south are the 
10 Mediterranean states, which share with the EU the Barcelona Process and Union for the 
Mediterranean (from west to east: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria).  
The historical narrative leading to today’s ENP tells us much about how the EU develops its 
policies. The accession of Spain and Portugal of 1986 was the first trigger, the new member 
states wanting to develop relations with their south Mediterranean neighbours. This led in 
1995 to the Barcelona Process, which became a comprehensive regional-multilateral 
framework for political and economic relations with the 10 south Mediterranean states, 
leading also to a set of Association Agreements and Free Trade Agreements with most of 
them. Meanwhile, in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the negotiation of a 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia, which established a template 
used for further PCAs with all other former Soviet states, including those in Central Asia. 
Next, when the EU was on the verge of completing the accession of Central and Eastern 
Europe in the early 2000s, the concern became to avoid neglecting the ‘new neighbours’, 
leading to proposals for a ‘neighbourhood policy’ initially to target Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova. This led to a chain reaction, first with the addition of the three south Caucasus 
states, and then also to the South Mediterranean neighbours via the argument from the 
southern EU member states that any new advantage offered to the eastern neighbours 
should be extended also to the south. This led to a confusing overlay of the ENP on top of the 
Barcelona Process, which only Brussels cognoscenti really understand. 
The working method of the ENP launched in 2005 for both east and south was based on a set 
of bilateral Action Plans, designed by the European Commission and bearing a strong 
resemblance to most of the 35 chapters of the accession process, even though membership 
prospects were excluded – hence the unofficial ‘enlargement-light’ expression. When the 
Commission had to make up its mind what to do, it extrapolated its own internal working 
method and toolkit of norms, laws and instruments, without clearly marking out how far 
this EU acquis should be diluted or selectively applied to the neighbours. On the contrary, the 
doctrine was that the most advanced neighbours should be invited to adopt the maximum 
amount of the acquis: “everything but the institutions” was an expression used by Romano 
Prodi when he was President of the Commission. The ENP launch also coincided in its 
timing, and was encouraged by the outbreak of the ‘colour revolutions’ in eastern Europe, 
Rose in Georgia and Orange in Ukraine. 
The next round in the EU’s north-south dialectics began when Nicholas Sarkozy became 
President of France in 2007, immediately announcing his intention to overtake the politically 
disappointing Barcelona Process and ENP with a new Union of the Mediterranean (UfM) 
that would bring together only the Mediterranean states of the EU and the south. This wild 
initiative, obviously not well thought through, hit a brick wall in Berlin, which was not ready 
to relinquish the EU’s Mediterranean policy to the southern member states. The proposal 
was quickly repackaged to become a further layer to the EU’s Mediterranean policy, leaving 
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many observers rather mystified how it related to the Barcelona Process and ENP. 
Technically its specificity is to promote major regional projects, with the aid of a secretariat 
in Barcelona, and a summit process initially jointly presided over by north and south in the 
persons of the then President Sarkozy and the then President Mubarak. Sarkozy’s political 
idea here was that this would be welcomed as a new equality in the relationship, 
notwithstanding Mubarak’s repressively undemocratic regime (we come to the end of 
Mubarak and the Arab uprising in a moment).  
However the next move was when the north returned in 2009 to the battle to keep the north-
south balance unimpaired, with Poland and Sweden launching the Eastern Partnership as a 
fresh overlay on top of the eastern branch of the ENP. The substance behind this was not 
much apparent beyond a wish to do ‘more’, and so the Commission was instructed to find 
some ideas to put behind this. Poland and Sweden would like Ukraine to be offered a 
membership perspective, but this is a non-starter for some other member states. The 
rationale found by the Commission was to complement the bilateralism of the ENP Action 
Plans with a regional-multilateral dimension, which was duly called the Eastern Partnership. 
This fitted in a rather tortured logic with what had already emerged for the Mediterranean, 
since the Barcelona Process, re-baptised ‘Barcelona Process - Union for the Mediterranean’, is 
essentially regional-multilateral, whereas the ENP is essentially bilateral. 
The latest round in neighbourhood dynamics is the Arab uprising starting in Tunisia and 
Egypt in early 2011. At the time of writing it is unclear where this indisputable turning point 
in Arab history is leading, with a wide array of conceivable regime scenarios – real 
democracy, modest democratic evolution, revolutionary chaos, failed state, military regime, 
renewed authoritarianism, Islamic state, etc. What is clear is that it has shaken up thinking in 
the EU about its neighbourhood policy. The former complicity of the EU, and especially 
Mediterranean member states such as France, Italy and Spain, with the former authoritarian 
regimes of North Africa in the supposed interests of security and stability has been 
completely discredited along with the EU’s disregard in practice for the democratic values 
supposed to be underlying the ENP. The Commission and High Representative hurried into 
completing a review of the ENP, giving renewed emphasis to what they now call ‘deep 
democracy’.  
The core economic objective of the ENP is to negotiate ‘deep and comprehensive free trade 
agreements’ (DCFTAs), for which negotiations have been concluded with Ukraine, but 
signature has been delayed because of the EU’s discontent with the politics of President 
Yanukovic, and in particular the imprisonment of his political rival, Yulia Timoshenko. 
DCFTA negotiations have been also now started with Moldova, Armenia and Georgia, but 
only after these countries had satisfied a heavy set of pre-conditions from the Commission’s 
trade policy department. These pre-conditions have been criticised for demanding too 
onerous a degree of compliance with EU internal market regulations for these neighbouring 
states which are not granted membership perspectives.2  
In response to the Arab uprising, there is a new stress on democracy, conditionality and 
increased financial assistance from the EU, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The open question is whether 
this can have real impact on the tumultuous political dynamics of these states. On its own, 
the EU has incentives of limited magnitudes to offer alongside the enormity of the political 
struggles going on in the Arab states. It is not alone, however, and there is the obvious case 
for coherent and mutually reinforcing actions by the EU, US, World Bank and IMF together. 
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The EU regards the Obama administration as a congenial partner at the level of doctrine, and 
the EU is working closely with the international financial institutions (IFIs) in any case in its 
neighbourhood.  
3. The competing hegemons 
The EU invited Russia to join in the ENP, but it refused to be grouped with the EU’s other 
‘neighbours’ among the former Soviet states, which are the target of its own continental 
regionalism. Russia as a global power with G8 and BRIC membership, has been willing to 
have a Strategic Partnership ‘of equals’ with the EU. There is no hegemon-periphery 
relationship at the geo-political level here. On the contrary, this becomes a tale of two 
competing hegemons in the same continent, diluted however with an overlay of pan-
European organisations.  
The EU-Russia relationship has been struggling for 20 years to find a comfortable 
equilibrium point, without really succeeding, but without disastrous conflict either. The two 
parties are totally different animals geo-politically: the EU is a complex, horizontal, 
normative civilian power structure devoid of military strength, while Russia under Putin has 
seen the restoration of a ‘verticality of power’ with its huge territorial Eurasian space, UN 
Security Council status, nuclear hardware and energy resources as its claim to great power 
status. The EU tries to draw Russia into its usual packages of norms and standards, ranging 
from the political to the technical. One Russia political discourse, especially Putin’s, is that it 
does not need to import anybody else’s norms, since Russia as a great power has its own. Yet 
the realities are more complex, with the manifest pressures within Russia for more 
democracy and a better rule of law. Medvedev, when President, pushed a ‘modernisation’ 
agenda both domestically and for relations with the EU, following Russia’s long history of 
aspirations towards its European identity. There is glaring contradiction in contemporary 
Russian politics between the ruling elite’s hunger for restored geo-political power and the 
increasing demands of society for a ‘normal European life’ and their disinterest in geo-
politics.  
Putin, however, now re-elected President, has announced priority for building up his pet 
project of a Eurasian Union, which does not yet exist, but for which a start has been made 
with a customs union into which Russia has so far drawn only Belarus and Kazakhstan, with 
ambitions for deepening with a single market and widening with further members. The 
project mimics various features of the EU, creating a ‘Commission’ with ‘Commissioners’, 
who are tasked with developing the enterprise. The unanswered question is whether this 
project can progress where the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. The major 
target is to draw Ukraine into the customs union and thence into the Eurasian Union, which 
Ukraine has so far rejected, since it would mean scrapping the DCFTA agreement with the 
EU and its broader European aspirations, and implies outright strategic competition over the 
same overlapping neighbourhood. Russia is willing to put serious money into the project, 
having already bailed out Belarus and made some significant loans to Ukraine. It woos 
Moldova, trying to factor into the process its hold over Transnistria, although Moldova 
currently prioritises its EU relationship. The three South Caucasus states reject the Eurasian 
Union offer, so its enlargement prospects focus on Kyrgizstan and Tajikistan, the two 
smallest and weakest states of central Asia. Russia hardly advances any normative basis for 
its neighbourhood policy beyond lip service to political non-interference, while in practice 
engaging intermittently in, or threatening coercive acts towards its neighbours, the most 
extreme example having been the war with Georgia in 2008. In August 2012 there emerged 
quite precise information on how the 2008 invasion of Georgia had been planned in advance, 
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and how Putin’s ‘decisiveness’ had been for a few days blocked by Medvedev’s 
‘indecisiveness’.  
Central Asia sees another theatre of overlapping neighbourhood policies, with Russia having 
made a concordat with China over their joint leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO), which is a loose framework legitimising China’s hugely expansive 
economic role in Central Asia, with major transport and other infrastructure developments 
supported from the Asian Development Bank. China clearly won the competition with 
Russia over the development of Turkmenistan’s gas exports, constructing an overland 
pipeline crossing other Central Asian states. On the other hand the consensus between China 
and Russia on the normative doctrine of political non-interference flies very well with 
Central Asia’s autocracies, in clear contradiction with the EU’s Central Asian ‘strategy’ that 
gives prominence to human rights. 
4. Pan-European multilateralism 
There are three significant institutions reflecting the long-standing and persistent case for an 
all-inclusive ‘one Europe’, which of course is the antithesis to the competing neighbourhood 
policies of the EU and Russia. The oldest is the Council of Europe, founded in 1948, whose 
core functions are the codification and protection of human rights enforced by the European 
Court of Human Rights, and broader and looser democracy promotion activity. Upon the 
collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989-91, all of the European states of the former Soviet bloc 
acceded. The second is the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
whose core function has been the codification of security norms in the basic principles of the 
Helsinki Founding Act of 1975, which from the beginning included all of Europe and the 
United States, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union was expanded to include all the 
newly independent states including the five Central Asians. The third is the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), founded in 1994 in order to help establish 
sound private-sector governance in the former communist states of the Soviet bloc.  
The key point about all three is that they define and embody the norms of modern Europe – 
respectively in the political, security and economic domains. From the EU’s standpoint, they 
are unambiguously reinforcing its objectives for the wider European space. From Russia’s 
standpoint they are all about the tensions and ambiguities in its present political and 
economic condition, fitting well with the views of Russia’s modernisers, but running into 
conflict with conservative and authoritarian forces. In these circumstances the three 
organisations could hardly become very powerful, yet their effectiveness differ. The OSCE 
has been sidelined by Russia, and is reduced to token activity, or frustrated attempts at 
conflict resolution. The EBRD has found a respected niche role in all post-communist states 
in helping insert sound corporate governance into the projects its funds. At the European 
Court of Human Rights more cases are brought against Russia than any other member state, 
yet Russia has respected its rulings and not walked out, and the role of the Court is 
important for Russian human rights activists. 
The human rights field makes for an interesting comparison between Europe and the 
Americas – i.e. between on the one hand the European Convention for Human Rights and its 
Court under the aegis of the Council of Europe, and on the other hand the Inter-American 
Convention for Human Rights and its Court under the aegis of the Organisation of American 
States (OAS). While the two Conventions and Courts have much in common, the major 
difference is that the United States as regional hegemon has undermined the Inter-American 
Convention and Court by refusing to ratify the Convention and accept the jurisdiction of the 
Court for its own affairs. The EU member states on the other hand are fully bound by the 
European Convention and Court, and now after the Lisbon Treaty the EU itself, as regional 
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hegemon, has acceded to the Convention for its own policies and accepts the jurisdiction of 
the Court. As a result it is not so surprising that the Inter-American Convention and Court 
are subject to serious attempts by left-oriented Latin American states led by Venezuela (the 
‘Alba’ countries) to undermine their functions, and Brazil has contested a Court ruling to the 
point of withdrawing in 2011 and not replacing its ambassador to the OAS.  
To complete this already complex landscape we should not forget NATO as the main pillar 
of the trans-Atlantic alliance, also located in Brussels, and whose European membership has 
enlarged alongside that of the EU. And there is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), born out of the post-war Marshall Plan, originally as the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), but which has gradually 
metamorphosed from an essentially European project into a global club of the world’s 
advanced economies.  
5. Conclusions – The relevance of European experiences and lessons 
learned 
Prompted by the euro crisis, the declining weight of the EU in the world economy and rising 
euroscepticism, one frequently hears comments these days about the demise of the European 
model or its irrelevance for other continents. Taking a different view, one can identify several 
features of the European experience (rather than any single model) of recent decades that 
amount to a pertinent set of lessons that other world regions may usefully take note of.  
The first experience has been that of market integration for the four freedoms – goods, 
services, labour and capital, completed under the single market programme that advanced 
decisively in 1992, and now still advances an increasingly wide and complex process of 
regulatory integration. The lesson that the EU learned several decades ago is that deep 
market integration requires a strong institutional and legal structure – legislature, executive 
and court of justice. Overall the EU’s experience here is looking like a quite robust model. It 
is particularly beneficial for economies that develop deep intra-industry trade and 
investment integration. It is therefore quite plausible that the ASEAN countries are now 
replicating much of this model in their 2015 ASEAN Economic Community project. By 
contrast, South America has divided between the Mercosur and more Pacific-oriented 
Andean states.  
The second experience of the EU has been that of adding the monetary union to the single 
market. The economic logic of this sequencing is also robust. As market integration deepens 
the costs of exchange rate uncertainty and instability increase. But the creators of the euro 
took the big risk of doing this with just an excellent, independent, ‘federal’ central bank. The 
monetary supervisory regime and above all the public finance system were left in a largely 
pre-federal state, relying on the member states to respect common budget rules while 
retaining their essential sovereignty over the budgetary instruments. The current euro crisis 
has shown that to have taken this politically attractive risk was a big mistake. The eurozone 
is now trying to build up adequate features of a banking union, fiscal union and political 
union. The lesson painfully learned, and now kindly offered to other continents, is not to 
make easy commitments to monetary union unless the parties truly accept the huge political 
implications, which obviously no other world continent is currently ready for. (Simple 
monetary union between an undisputed hegemon and small peripheral units is a well-tested 
formula, but not a model for less asymmetric groupings of states).  
The third experience is indeed that of political integration. Contemporary Europe is quite 
post-modern in the sense that the Westphalian state model is now greatly diluted by both 
sub-state regionalism and supranationalism, translating into complex three-level power 
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structures (regional, national, European), matched by an increasing degree of three-level 
identities perceived by citizens. These features of contemporary Europe appear to be both 
deeply rooted, yet also still of uncertain stability. The euro crisis pushes functionally for 
more euro-federalism, which Germany, Italy, Belgium and some others support. But this 
encounters a divide not only with the eurosceptic British, but also political resistance in some 
of the committed Europeans, notably France. This is the current illustration of the old saying 
that “Europe is a journey to an unknown destination”. It is also a cautionary tale for other 
continents espousing ‘integration’. What does one mean by this? How far can one anticipate 
its dynamics? These are terribly difficult questions even for a Europe of unquestionable 
commitment to common democratic values, how much more so for other continents with 
greater political heterogeneity. 
The fourth experience is about the EU’s projection of its norms and standards into its wider 
neighbourhood in Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean. Europe today may be 
both post-modern and post-colonial, but it is not entirely unfounded for critics to say that it 
is also softly neo-colonial in its promotion of democracy and free trade based on its market 
regulations. The EU’s enthusiasm for spreading this gospel bears some comparison with 
Europe’s self-appointed ‘civilising mission’ in the 19th and earlier centuries, for which a 
British governor of Hong Kong once famously said that Christianity and free trade were the 
two sides of the same coin (and now just substitute democracy for Christianity). In 
developing the current outreach of its norms and standards into its neighbourhood, the EU 
has been profoundly influenced by the historic transformation, both political and economic, 
of the formerly communist states of Central Europe as they acceded to the EU. This 
transformative experience encouraged the EU to try for the same results through what has 
been unofficially called an ‘enlargement-lite’ neighbourhood policy, i.e. using the same 
norms and political conditionalities, but without the incentive of accession to membership. 
The disproportion between objectives and incentives is dramatically illustrated in the 
revolutionary turmoil of the Arab spring, inducing the EU now into advocating ‘deep 
democracy’ in the region, whereas the post-revolutionary outcomes there offer the widest of 
conceivable scenarios, including the failed state, the radical Islamist state, renewed 
authoritarianism as well as democratic progress.  
In promoting all-European democracy, the EU has placed itself in outright political 
competition with Russia, which promotes a more clearly neo-imperial and somewhat-
coercive club of non-democracies called the Eurasian Union, while still bizarrely mimicking 
the EU’s institutional structure to support its new customs union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. Europe has also some relatively weak or narrowly specialised pan-European 
norm-setting organisations (Council of Europe, OSCE, EBRD), which nonetheless have value 
in bringing together otherwise heterogeneous neighbours, and facilitating a long and slow 
process of normative convergence, and at least softening the conflict of values between the 
EU and Russia. The role of these organisations may in some cases be compared with 
analogous organisations in the Americas, notably in the human rights field where formal 
structures are rather similar, but the effectiveness of the inter-American system seems to be 
relatively weak and contested. Like Europe, the Americas also have the complications of two 
leading powers, Brazil and the US with overlapping neighbourhood polices, with some 
geopolitical tensions between the two but perhaps with lesser degrees of political divergence 
compared to the case of the EU and Russia.  
Despite its complexities, limitations and internal crises, the EU has fashioned relatively 
positive relationships with its neighbours, compared to some other continental regions. The 
EU’s relations with virtually all of its neighbours are constructive and substantial, and 
devoid of ugly coercive aspects or hard security threats, which may be true of Brazil also, but 
not of China, India or Russia.  
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Of course there are unique features to the European experience. The huge political 
investment in supranational institutions and law was only possible as a result of the trauma 
of two world wars, the extraordinary post-war reconciliation of historical enemies and the 
consensus in favour of democracy following the disasters of fascism. While these conditions 
are not replicated elsewhere, Japan, China and Korea still now have reason to reflect together 
in East Asia on the way in which Germany succeeded in its reconciliation with France and 
the rest of Europe. On the other hand, for South or Latin America the preconditions for 
integration would seem in principle to be relatively favourable, given their geographical 
unity and common history, culture and sense of identity. These advantages are just waiting 
to be exploited.  
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